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THE "PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE" AS
CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE
William F Fox, Jr. *
The American criminal law concept known as the "presumption of in-
nocence" has been described variously as:
-"that bedrock 'axiomatic and elementary' principle whose en-
forcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our
criminal law."'
-"a basic component of a fair trial."
'2
-"[an] assumption that, in the absence of contrary facts, it is to
be assumed that any person's conduct upon a given occasion was
lawful."
3
-"not a presumption at all in the legal sense."
'4
As criminal law boilerplate, the presumption has been consistently in-
voked,5 but rarely analyzed. Until the last Supreme Court term, the pre-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Catholic University of America Law School, B.S., J.D.,
LL.M. Professor Fox was among the original consultants to the District of Columbia Law
Revision Commission and assisted in the drafting of the proposed D.C. Criminal Code.
Many of the topics raised in this article were the subject of discussion by the Commission.
The views expressed herein, however, are his alone.
1. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970) (requiring the use of the reasonable doubt
standard in all juvenile proceedings adjudicating acts which would be crimes if the juvenile
were tried as an adult) (quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432 (1895)).
2. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976) (affirming the conviction of a defend-
ant wearing prison clothes throughout the trial because the defense counsel failed to raise a
timely objection to the clothing).
3. C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 342 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972) [hereinafter cited
as MCCORMICK].
4. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTr, CRIMINAL LAW § 8 (1972). A presumption is generally
used to describe the situation in which "a party having the burden of producing evidence of
fact A, introduces proof of fact B." Such proof then may permit the jury to presume or infer
the existence of fact A. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, at § 342. After this inference is estab-
lished, presumption in the "legal sense" builds on this rudimentary concept by shifting the
burden of producing evidence, as well as the burden of persuasion on the question to the
adversary. Id. For a more complete discussion of this concept, see text accompanying notes
24-26, infra.
5. A fifty state survey has not been undertaken for this article, but a number of secon-
dary sources indicate that the vast majority of states approve of the presumption of inno-
cence instruction. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, at § 342; 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1221
(1961).
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sumption could arguably be viewed as one of those incantations, much like
the rule of twelve jurors dispensed with in Williams v. Florida,6 that bor-
ders on the mystical, but which serves no useful purpose and merely clut-
ters our criminal jurisprudence with ritual rather than substance.
7
The presumption of innocence rule has been criticized because it is not a
true presumption and may confuse jurors, particularly those who later
hear a much more detailed instruction on a bona fide evidentiary pre-
There appear to be only two American jurisdictions that hold that the presumption of
innocence instruction need not be given. The Kentucky Supreme Court has held that failure
to give the instruction is not reversible error, and in so holding has suggested that the pre-
sumption of innocence is a concept "too favorable to the defendant." Swango v. Common-
wealth, 291 Ky. 690, 165 S.W.2d 182, 183 (1942). See Mink v. Commonwealth, 228 Ky. 674,
15 S.W.2d 463 (1929) (reasonable doubt instruction is all that is necessary in a prosecution
for murder). At least two North Carolina cases contain similar language, but in both cases
the trial court mentioned the presumption of innocence, although it refused to elaborate on
its ruling as requested by the defendant. State v. Tipton, 8 N.C. App. 53, 173 S.E.2d 527,
529 (1970); State v. Perry, 226 N.C. 530, 39 S.E.2d 460, 464 (1946).
Failure to give the presumption instruction in federal jury trials has been held to be re-
versible error for some time, although the doctrine had never been required as a matter of
constitutional law. See Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 460-61 (1895). In that case the
Supreme Court reversed the district court's conviction of a bank president on embezzlement
charges because the court had refused to charge the jury as to the presumption of the of-
ficer's innocence. The Supreme Court held that in all federal criminal cases, it is error to
refuse to charge on the presumption, even though the trial court fully and accurately
charged on the doctrine of reasonable doubt. Id. at 456-61. This decision was made, how-
ever, without reaching the constitutional issues. In United States v. Fernandez, 496 F.2d
1294 (5th Cir. 1974), the Fifth Circuit reversed a conviction in which the defendant neither
proffered a presumption instruction nor objected to its deletion. The court, without reaching
the constitutional merits, concluded that the cumulative effect of the trial court's failure to
give the instruction and prejudicial comments by the prosecutor warranted reversal under
the federal plain error doctrine. Id. at 1299, 1302-03.
In Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976), the Supreme Court linked the wearing of
prison clothing with the presumption of innocence because of the potential impact of the
custodial garb on the jurors' judgment. The Court stated in dicta that such apparel violated
a defendant's right to a fair trial of which the presumption of innocence was also part. Id. at
503-05. The holding of the case was much more narrow, however. The Court refused to
overturn the conviction because of defense counsel's failure to make a contemporaneous
objection to the defendant's attire. Id. at 512-13.
6. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
7. Sometime in the fourteenth century, the size of the jury at common law came to be
fixed generally at twelve. Id. at 89. In Williams, the Court reviewed the sparse history of
the rule of twelve jurors and found that most justifications for the rule "rest on little more
than mystical or superstitious insights into the significance of '12.'" Id. at 88. Concededly,
the idea behind the presumption of innocence is much more than myth or superstition, but
having been so long with us and so rarely analyzed, it has become more a matter of rote and
therefore lacking in significance. Of course, as a society we may want our trials to be partly
ritualistic, as well as fact-finding occasions. For insight into the manner in which other
societies regard the presumption of innocence, see Fletcher, Two Kinds of Legal Rules. .4




sumption.8 A stronger criticism, however, is that it loses virtually all in-
dependent significance when it is coupled with the much more
fundamental reasonable doubt instruction. Because the presumption of in-
nocence is given practical effect through the reasonable doubt standard, it
can scarcely be said to possess any true weight of its own. 9
Two recent criminal law codifications have dealt with these perceived
defects in different ways. The Model Penal Code, promulgated in final
form in 1962 and now serving as the basis for many state codifications,
retains the concept of the presumption as supplementary to the reasonable
doubt standard, but changes the crucial term from "presumption" to "as-
sumption": "[i]n the absence of such proof [beyond a reasonable doubt],
the innocence of the defendant is assumed."' 0 The drafters of one of the
several variations of the proposed federal criminal code, by deleting the
presumption of innocence instruction requirement, have suggested that the
existing constitutional doctrine on the reasonable doubt standard renders
8. See text accompanying notes 24-31 infra. The confusion arises because jurors will
likely assume that the presumption of innocence is a true presumption and will attempt to
draw the same inference from it as from true evidentiary presumptions. In evidentiary pre-
sumptions, the inference of the existence of fact A is permitted to be drawn from the proof of
fact B, because it is more likely to be true than not. See note 4 supra. No such inference can
be drawn from an accused's presumption of innocence since it merely describes his right to
do nothing until the prosecution has met its burdens of production and persuasion. Further-
more, jurors may be confused by the fact that true presumptions have a basis in fact, while
the majority of defendants presumed to be innocent are found guilty. See LAFAVE &
ScoTT, supra note 4, at § 8.
9. See text accompanying notes 42-51 infra.
The expression 'beyond a reasonable doubt' appears most often in the trial court's
instructions to the jury, which is generally told: the defendant is presumed to be
innocent; the mere fact that he has been charged with a crime is not to be taken as
any evidence of his guilt; and the prosecution must prove, beyond a reasonable
doubt, all the elements of the crime charged. While some courts have undertaken
to define the term 'reasonable doubt,' other courts have thought that the words
themselves are sufficiently clear not to require any embellishment.
LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 4, at § 8 (emphasis added). Other commentators have resisted
defining the term. See note 48 infra.
10. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12(1) (1962). The presumption of innocence is not a true
presumption, but a device to protect the constitutional rights of an accused. See text accom-
panying note 39 infra. Such a device might confuse jurors who attempt to apply it in the
same manner as a true presumption. See note 8 supra. This confusion can be avoided by
correctly labeling the concept as an "assumption of innocence," which indicates that the
accused has only an appearance, and not a likelihood of innocence. As McCormick states,
this "describes our assumption that, in the absence of contrary facts, it is to be assumed that
any person's conduct upon a given occasion was lawful." MCCORMICK, supra note 3, at §
342. In addition, a true presumption has a basis in fact and thus the inference drawn is more
likely to be true than not. See note 8 supra. The relabeling of the presumption of inno-
cence, however, would have little substantive effect in that it would not change the burden
on the prosecution to produce evidence sufficient to show a crime and to persuade the jury of
the accused's guilt.
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such an additional instruction superfluous." In contrast, the Supreme
Court recently raised the presumption of innocence to constitutional di-
mension in Taylor v. Kentucky' 2 when it held that a criminal defendant's
right to a fair trial is violated whenever the trial judge fails to give a re-
quested presumption of innocence instruction.
The facts involved in the Taylor case were typical of the petty offense
cases so common in our lower-level criminal courts. Taylor and an accom-
plice, who was tried separately,' 3 were accused of forcing their way into a
friend's house where they allegedly struck him and fled with his billfold
containing an estimated ten to fifteen dollars. Taylor was tried on a single
count of second degree robbery in a jury trial, apparently completed in less
than a day. The state's only witness was the victim. Taylor took the stand
as the only defense witness and denied the victim's accusations, testifying
that he was elsewhere at the time in question. The jury returned a verdict
of guilty. '
4
At first glance, the case appeared to be a simple swearing contest, with
the jury basing its verdict on the credibility of the witnesses. There were,
however, additional significant circumstances. The prosecutor made sev-
eral statements during his opening and closing statements which suggested
that Taylor's status as a defendant tended to establish his guilt. 15 More-
over, the trial court rejected two jury instructions proffered by the defend-
ant: that he was presumed to be innocent and that the indictment was not
evidence to be considered against him. 16 Although the judge instructed
11. See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON PROPOSED RULES OF CRIMI-
NAL PROCEDURE, S. REP. No. 605, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1135-40 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
S. REP. No. 605]. Subdivision (a)(5) of proposed Rule 25.1 places two restrictions on the use
of presumptions. The first requires the court, before it may submit a presumption to the jury,
to find that "there is sufficient evidence of the fact that gives rise to the presumption to
support a reasonable belief as to the fact's existence beyond a reasonable doubt" and that
the evidence as a whole does not preclude a reasonable juror from finding the presumed fact
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 1139. Having made these determinations, the second
restriction requires the court to "then instruct the jury that the presumed fact must be estab-
lished beyond a reasonable doubt." 1d. The jury, however, may arrive at that judgment on
the basis of the presumption above.
Since there is not "sufficient evidence of the fact that gives rise to [a] presumption [of
innocence]" because the presumption is really an assumption, more likely false than true, the
court should not instruct the jury as to a presumption of innocence. It should simply give
the "beyond a reasonable doubt" instruction.
12. 436 U.S. 478 (1978).
13. There is no explanation in either the state or federal opinions as to the disposition of
the accomplice's case.
14. 436 U.S. at 479-81.
15. Id. at 486-88.
16. Id. at 480-81. The requested instruction on the presumption of innocence stated:
The law presumes a defendant to be innocent of a crime. Thus a defendant, al-
though accused, begins the trial with a 'clean slate.' That is, with no evidence
[Vol. 28:253
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the jury regarding the reasonable doubt standard, the court's instructions
consisted of five short paragraphs which took only about three minutes to
recite. 17
On appeal to the state's intermediate appellate court, Taylor argued that
the fourteenth amendment's due process clause required both the pre-
sumption of innocence and the "indictment-not-evidence" instructions.
The court, nonetheless, affirmed the conviction on the basis of existing
state case law, without discussing the federal constitutional issues.' 8 The
Kentucky Supreme Court denied review.' 9 The United States Supreme
against him. The law permits nothing but legal evidence presented before a jury to
be considered in support of any charge against the accused. So the presumption of
innocence alone is sufficient to acquit a defendant, unless you are satisfied beyond
a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt after careful and impartial considera-
tion of all the evidence in the case.
Id. at 480 n.5.
The "indictment-not-evidence" instruction stated:
The jury is instructed that an indictment is in no way any evidence against the
defendant and no adverse inference can be drawn against the defendant from a
finding in the indictment. The indictment is merely a written accusation, charging
the defendant with the commission of the crime. It has no probative force and
carries with it no implication of guilt.
Id. at 481 n.6.
The language of the presumption of innocence instruction is nearly identical with the
standard instruction set out in I E. DEVITT & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND
INSTRUCTIONS 310 (3d ed. 1977), one of the standard works on jury trials. The source of the
"indictment-not-evidence" instruction is not clear.
17. The trial court's instructions included a perfunctory instruction on reasonable
doubt:
[I]f upon the whole case you have a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt
you will find him not guilty. The term 'reasonable doubt'. . . means a substantial
doubt, a real doubt, in that you must ask yourself not whether a better case might
have been proved but whether after hearing all the evidence you actually doubt
that the defendant is guilty.
436 U.S. at 481 n.6. This instruction was described by the Supreme Court as "hardly a
model of clarity." Id. at 488. Compare this instruction with the pattern jury instruction on
reasonable doubt in the District of Columbia:
Reasonable doubt, as the name implies, is a doubt based on reason, a doubt for
which you can give a reason. It is such a doubt as would cause a juror, after careful
and candid and impartial considerations of all the evidence, to be so undecided
that he cannot say that he has an abiding conviction of the defendant's guilt. It is
such a doubt as would cause a reasonable person to hesitate or pause in the graver
or more important transactions of life. However, it is not a fanciful doubt nor a
whimsical doubt, nor a doubt based on conjecture. It is a doubt which is based on
reason. The government is not required to establish guilt beyond all doubt, or to a
mathematical certainty or a scientific certainty. Its burden is to establish guilt be-
yond a reasonable doubt.
Instruction No. 2.09, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS (3d ed. 1978).
18. Taylor v. Commonwealth, 551 SW.2d 813, 813-14 (Ky. 1977).
19. The denial of discretionary review by the Kentucky Supreme Court is apparently an
unreported disposition.
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Court, however, reversed the conviction, agreeing with Taylor that the
"cumulative effect" of the circumstances of the case, including the absence
of a presumption of innocence instruction, violated Taylor's "due process
guarantee of fundamental fairness. '20 In reaching this holding, the Court
concluded that the presumption of innocence instruction, or an instruction
which otherwise conveys the same sense as the presumption instruction,
has a "purging effect" wholly apart from the reasonable doubt instruc-
tion.21 Justice Brennan concurred, stating that the instruction is "a basic
component of a fair trial under our system of criminal justice. '22 Justice
Stevens and Justice Rehnquist dissented, arguing that although the pre-
sumption instruction was desirable, its absence did not create constitu-
tional error.2
3
The Court might well have stayed its hand. The Taylor facts appear to
be a poor setting for a landmark decision on any point of criminal law and
especially inappropriate for an extended analysis of the presumption of
innocence as a matter of constitutional dimension. Additionally, the
Court's opinion leaves much to be desired. It neither provides clear guide-
lines for future criminal jury instructions nor resolves with any precision
the impact of the presumption doctrine. Additionally, in attempting to
narrow its holding to the Taylor facts, the Court has created uncertainty as
to the breadth of its constitutional mandate.
I. THE "PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE" AS A PRESUMPTION
The term "presumption of innocence" has always been a misnomer.
Professors LaFave and Scott, echoing a long history of scholarly criticism,
point out that it "is actually not a presumption at all in the legal sense...
[i]t is not even a presumption in the popular sense of a thing which is more
likely to be true than not, for statistically more people who are charged
20. 436 U.S. at 487. See id. at n.15. Because of this conclusion, the Court did not reach
Taylor's additional claim asserting the refusal to instruct the jury that an indictment is not
evidence independently constituted reversible error. Id.
21. Id. at 486. Thus it operates as a means to protect a criminal defendant's "constitu-
tional right to be judged solely on the basis of proof adduced at trial." Id.
In United States v. Thaxton, cited by the Supreme Court in Taylor, 436 U.S. at 485, the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit discussed the purging effect of the presumption of
innocence. 483 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1973). In Taylor the Supreme Court noted that the purg-
ing function "cautions the jury to put away from their minds all the suspicion that arises
from the arrest, the indictment, and the arraignment, and to reach their conclusion solely
from the legal evidence adduced." 436 U.S. at 485 (quoting 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §
2511 (3d ed. 1940)).
22. 436 U.S. at 490 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501,
503 (1976)).
23. 436 U.S. at 491-92 (Stevens and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
[Vol. 28:253
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with crime are convicted as guilty than are acquitted .... *"24 A true pre-
sumption, as that term is used in the rules of evidence, is a valuable device
in both civil and criminal litigation because it permits an inference to be
drawn from a fact in evidence. 25 True evidentiary presumptions often
have been used in criminal jury trials. The Supreme Court has never cate-
gorically disapproved of their use, even though the device can inhibit both
the allocation of the burden of proof - which in turn ultimately affects the
reasonable doubt standard - and the defendant's usual prerogative to re-
main silent.
26
The Supreme Court has examined a number of presumptions used in
criminal litigation, considered their effect on the prosecution's burden of
proof, and developed a test for determining their constitutionality. For
instance, in United States v. Gainey,27 the Court upheld the use of a federal
24. LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 4, at § 8.
25. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 474, 484 n.12 (1978). See MCCORMICK, supra note 3,
at § 342. See note 4 supra for a description of a true presumption. The term "presumption"
is often used interchangeably with the term "inference." Nevertheless, some courts appear
to use "presumption" to refer to conclusions which must be drawn from certain other facts,
and use the term "inference" to refer only to conclusions which may be drawn from such
facts. See, e.g., Bray v. United States, 306 F.2d 743, 747-48 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
26. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, at § 344. McCormick notes that in criminal cases, even
though its effect may be no more than that of a permissible inference:
a presumption may be sufficient to take an otherwise defective prosecution case to
the jury and ultimately result in a conviction that otherwise could not have oc-
curred. Furthermore, the existence of a presumption as to a particular element of
the crime may force the defendant to introduce proof in rebuttal ...and thus
force him to waive his constitutional right to remain silent.
Id.
Even though the Supreme Court has never disapproved of the use of evidentiary pre-
sumptions in criminal jury trials, the Court has disapproved their use in specific instances.
See, e.g., Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943), in which the Court reversed a conviction
under the Federal Firearms Act making it "unlawful for any person who has been convicted
of a crime of violence . . . to receive any firearm. . . which has been shipped. . . in inter-
state . . . commerce" and further providing that "the possession of a firearm ... by any
such person shall be presumptive evidence that such firearm was. . . received by such per-
son in violation of this Act." Federal Firearms Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-785, ch. 850, §
902(f), 52 Stat. 1250, 1251 (repealed 1968). In holding this presumption to be a violation of
due process, the Court noted that the prosecution had failed to prove a rational connection
between the possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a crime of violence and the
receipt by that person of the firearm in interstate commerce subsequent to the enactment of
the Firearms Act. 319 U.S. at 466-68.
Evidentiary presumptions shift the burden of proof as well as affect the defendant's usual
prerogative to stand mute under the presumption of innocence. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §
5601(b) (1976), which provides that the presence of a person at the site of a still, "shall be
deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction, unless the defendant explains such pres-
ence to the satisfaction of the jury." Id. Consequently, under this statute, the reasonable
doubt standard is reversed: the defendant is effectively presumed guilty and must establish
his innocence.
27. 380 U.S. 63 (1965).
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statutory presumption that a defendant's unexplained presence at the site
of an illegal still is sufficient, in and of itself, to convict that person of
unlawful operation of the still.28 The presumption was upheld by the
Court on several grounds, perhaps the most persuasive of which was the
existence of the presumption in statutory form. The enactment of the stat-
ute and its accompanying legislative history constituted a congressional
finding that such cases were nearly impossible to prosecute without the
assistance of the presumption. 29 Implicitly, the enactment constituted a
legislative finding that the presumption had a solid basis in fact. In sus-
taining the Gainey presumption, the Court asserted that similar presump-
tions could be utilized as long as there were a "rational connection"
between the fact proved (presence at the still) and the ultimate fact pre-
sumed (operation of the still).3
°
If Gainey's "rational connection" test were applied to the presumption
of innocence, however, the presumption would probably be destroyed.
First, there have never been any findings, either legislative or judicial, that
the presumption of innocence has a basis in fact. Moreover, it has never
been shown that prosecutions or defenses could not go forward without its
assistance. Indeed, as noted, what little empirical evidence exists tends to
undercut the presumption as a factual assertion, since most persons tried
for serious offenses are found guilty. 31 In addition, the presumption is a
matter of negative inference rather than the positive inference drawn by a
28. 26 U.S.C. § 5601(b)(2) (1976). Even before Congress enacted this statute, at least
one circuit approved a judge-made presumption of similar impact. Barton v. United States,
267 F. 174, 175-76 (4th Cir. 1920). Accord, Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837 (1973)
(judge-made inference that knowledge of the stolen character of goods may be inferred from
unexplained possession of those goods sustained). Cf. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6
(1969) (although rational connection test approved, test not met by statutory presumption
that knowledge of importation of marijuana may be presumed, in certain circumstances,
from mere possession).
29. 380 U.S. at 65.
30. Id. at 66-67. Evidentiary presumptions will be deemed to lack a "rational connec-
tion" between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed when it cannot be said "with
substantial assurance" that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved
fact on which it is made to depend. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 36 (1969).
31. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement has found that of 177,000 per-
sons formally charged with serious offenses in 1965, about 160,000 were convicted. An addi-
tional 9,000 cases were dismissed, and 8,000 were acquitted at trial. PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: THE CHALLENGE
OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 262-63 (Figure 5) (1967). See text accompanying note 24
supra and LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 4, at § 8. Professor Thayer, the first commentator
to cast substantial doubt on the factual basis of the presumption, quoted a study by
Maitland: "Law presumes that the prisoner is innocent until he is found guilty, but it were
well to wager four to one that the jury will be satisfied of his guilt. In 1883 there were 11,347
persons found guilty against 2723 found not guilty." J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE
ON EVIDENCE 647 (1896).
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Gainey-type presumption. In Gainey, presence led to an inference of oper-
ation; the presumption of innocence, by contrast, prohibits the drawing of
any inferences from the defendant's remaining silent. Thus, the logical
progression from basic fact to ultimate fact is not present in the presump-
tion of innocence.
Moreover, if the presumption of innocence were a true presumption
with actual evidentiary effect, it might well be used to invalidate long
standing pretrial practices, such as bail and pretrial detention. If the pre-
sumption exists as a matter of evidence, under conventional practice the
prosecutor would have to introduce sufficient evidence to rebut it. In other
words, if the presumption constituted evidence of lack of guilt, the prose-
cutor would be forced to produce at least some evidence of guilt sufficient
to overcome the presumption, or the defendant could not be handled prior
to trial in any manner suggesting guilt. Since most prosecutors are loath to
put on their entire case during the grand jury inquiry or at the preliminary
hearing, defendants could conceivably invoke the presumption to circum-
vent bail requirements or pretrial custody. Of course, the Supreme Court
has never gone this far. The District of Columbia pre-trial detention stat-
ute, for example, has been upheld as constitutional. 32 Nothing in the
Taylor opinion suggests that the presumption of innocence operates at any
time in the criminal process outside the narrow context of the trial itself.
While the Supreme Court has never analyzed the presumption of inno-
cence in light of the Gainey test, it has long recognized that the presump-
tion of innocence does not work as a true presumption. In an 1895 opinion,
Coffin v. United States,33 the Court used the presumption in a technical
evidentiary sense as "an instrument of proof,"' 34 that is, as actual "evidence
in favor of the accused."'35 After scathing criticism by Professor Thayer,36
the Court abandoned the Coffin actual evidence concept only two years
later in Agnew v. United States.
37
32. Blunt v. United States, 322 A.2d 579 (D.C. 1974) (upholding as constitutional D.C.
CODE § 23-1322 (1973)).
33. 156 U.S. 432 (1895).
34. Id. at 459.
35. Id. at 460. The Court concluded that authorities supporting the view that the rea-
sonable doubt instruction "entirely embodies" the presumption instruction were "few and
unsatisfactory." Id. at 457.
36. THAYER, supra note 31, at 566-76. The Taylor Court read Thayer to distinguish the
presumption from evidence, categorizing it instead as "a way of describing the prosecution's
duty both to produce evidence of guilt and to convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt."
Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. at 484 n.12 (citing THAYER, supra note 3, at 560-63).
37. 165 U.S. 36, 51-52 (1897). In Agnew, the trial court instructed that:
The defendant is presumed to be innocent of all the charges against him until he is
proven guilty by the evidence submitted to you. This presumption remains with
19791
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Writing for the majority in Taylor, Justice Powell approved Thayer's
criticisms of Coffin.38 In a lengthy footnote, Justice Powell recognized that
the presumption of innocence is not a "mandatory inference drawn from a
fact in evidence"; rather it is merely "an inaccurate, shorthand description
of the right of the accused to remain inactive and secure, until the prosecu-
tion has taken up its burden and produced evidence and effected persua-
sion . . . -39 Unfortunately, the majority's analysis of the presumption
did not address matters of evidence, and hence avoided the opportunity to
eliminate the inaccurate use of the term. The Court hinted that the word
"presumption" was misleading and impliedly approved the trend, initiated
by the Model Penal Code, toward the use of the term "assumption.
40 It
failed to lay the word "presumption" to rest, however, apparently because
of its perceived "salutary effect upon lay jurors."
'41
II. THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE AS AN ADJUNCT OF THE
REASONABLE DOUBT STANDARD
Taylor's majority opinion suggests the Court's agreement with the idea
long advocated by legal scholars, that the reasonable doubt standard and
the defendant until such time in the progress of the case that you are satisfied of the
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at 5 I. The defendant tendered an instruction that included as a final sentence: "This
presumption [of innocence] is to be treated by you as evidence giving rise to resulting proof
to the full extent of its legal efficacy." Id.
Without expressly overruling Coffin, the Supreme Court stated that "[t~he instruction
given was quite correct and substantially covered the instruction refused, and as to the latter
[the defendant's tendered instruction] the court might well have declined to give it on the
ground of the tendency of its closing sentence to mislead." Id. at 51-52. The Agnew Court
regarded Coffin as distinguishable because the trial court in Coffin refused to give any pre-
sumption of innocence instruction. Id. at 52.
38. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. at 483-84 n.12.
39. Id. In other words, the prosecution bears the burdens of production and persuasion
as to the case-in-chief and must satisfy its burden by proof of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. This was the message of In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970), in which the Court
recognized that the presumption of innocence can be given effect through the reasonable
doubt standard. See generally text accompanying notes 42-55 infra.
40. Justice Powell pointed out that the presumption of innocence is "not technically a
'presumption' " but rather is "better characterized as an 'assumption' that is indulged in the
absence of contrary evidence." 436 U.S. at 484 n.12. He then cited with approval a Missis-
sippi case, Carr v. State, 192 Miss. 152, 156, 4 So. 2d 887, 888 (1944), one of the first opinions
to speak of the "assumption" of innocence. Possibly, the Court was attempting to prevent
future semantical problems. Nevertheless, if the Court recognized the use of "presumption"
as "inaccurate," it should not have sanctioned its use: above all, jury instructions should be
accurate.
For a discussion of the potential impact on laypersons of each of the two words, see text
accompanying notes 62-65 infra.
41. 436 U.S. at 484.
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the presumption of innocence are logically similar concepts. 42 The Court
nonetheless required that a presumption instruction be given even when a
reasonable doubt instruction is given, because lay jurors need whatever
additional guidance the presumption instruction provides.
43
Taylor marks the first time the Court has drawn such a distinction. In In
re Winshj,"44 the Supreme Court raised the reasonable doubt standard to a
matter of constitutional due process. The Winship Court dealt with a New
York juvenile proceeding in which the presiding judge had determined
that the applicable standard of proof was a mere "preponderance" of the
evidence, although the reasonable doubt standard would have been ap-
plied had the young man been tried as an adult. In reversing, the Supreme
Court pointed out that the reasonable doubt standard is a matter of consti-
tutional dimension because it is "a prime instrument for reducing the risk
of convictions resting on factual error . . . . 45 Moreover, it is "indispen-
sable, for it 'impresses on the trier of fact the necessity of reaching a sub-
jective state of certitude of the facts in issue.' "46 Thus, according to
Winship, the reasonable doubt standard must be applied, irrespective of
whether the trial is a bench or jury trial, and irrespective of whether the
person accused is an adult or a juvenile.47 By contrast, the presumption of
innocence was mentioned only once in Winship, and then only as a con-
42. The Court stated that although the Coffin Court concluded the two concepts were
"logically separate and distinct, .. sharp scholarly criticism demonstrated the error of that
view .. " 436 U.S. at 483.
43. Id. at 484-85. Professor Wigmore notes that the presumption of innocence requires
the prosecution by evidence to convince the jury of the accused's guilt and conveys to the
jury an "additional caution ... to consider, in the material for their belief, nothing but the
evidence, i.e., no surmises based on the present situation of the accused." J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2511 (3d ed. 1940) (emphasis in original), quoted in 436 U.S. at 484-85. Profes-
sor McCormick in his first edition does not go this far, stating merely that: "the standard
instruction on the state's burden of [proof by reasonable doubt] amply covers these
points. . . . The instruction on 'presumption of innocence' should, it seems, be regarded
merely as a traditional but unnecessary amplification .... ." C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 309, at 649 (1954). In the second edition of MCCORMICK, however, the authors
rejected this argument, noting that "although the phrase is technically inaccurate and per-
haps even misleading in the sense that it suggests that there is some inherent probability that
the defendant is innocent, it should not be discarded." MCCORMICK, supra note 3, at § 342.
44. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
45. Id. at 363. The Court, agreeing with the dissenters in the lower court, noted that a
criminal defendant" 'would be at a severe disadvantage amounting to a lack of fundamental
fairness, if he could be adjudged guilty and imprisoned for years on the strength of the same
evidence as would suffice in a civil case.'" Id. (quoting W. v. Family Court, 24 N.Y.2d 196,
205, 247 N.E.2d 253, 254, 299 N.Y.S.2d 414, 422 (1967)).
46. Id. at 364 (quoting Dorsen & Rezneck, In Re Gault and the Future ofJuvenile Law, 1
FAM. L.Q. 1, 26 (1967)).
47. The issue of typing the defendant as an adult or juvenile was disposed of in an
earlier case, In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), in which the Court required adherence to certain
minimum due process guarantees in juvenile proceedings which would have resulted in
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cept which is given "concrete substance" through the reasonable doubt
standard.48 Nowhere in Winshiv is there a suggestion that the presump-
tion is an independent due process requirement.
49
By emphasizing the critical importance of the reasonable doubt standard
in both jury and bench trials, Winship indicates that even trial judges need
to be reminded that evidence in criminal proceedings must meet the rea-
sonable doubt standard. Thus, the Winship opinion does not tie the rea-
sonable doubt standard to jury instructions. Taylor, by contrast, appears
to require the presumption of innocence instruction only in jury trials, in
which laypersons need the additional admonition provided by a separate
instruction on the presumption. By implicitly making a distinction be-
tween jury and bench trials, the Court appears to suggest that although
both concepts evoke constitutional doctrine, the presumption is less impor-
tant because it is only an instructional device for laypersons, whereas the
reasonable doubt standard governs the deliberations of both juries and
judges sitting alone.
criminal prosecution, if the accused were an adult. Winship merely decided that one ele-
ment of minimal due process was the reasonable doubt standard.
48. 397 U.S. at 363. The Court echoed its earlier emphasis on the presumption's impor-
tance: "The standard provides concrete substance for the presumption of innocence - that
bedrock 'axiomatic and elementary' principle whose 'enforcement lies at the foundation of
the administration of our criminal law.'" Id. (quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432,
453 (1895)).
It is somewhat ironic that the standard itself is so heavily emphasized by both Court and
commentators, considering that many of the same commentators have consistently refused
to standardize the definition of reasonable doubt. The Model Penal Code, for example, has
strenuously resisted a definition. ABA-ALI MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13, Comment at 109
(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). Even the Brown Commission, a recent criminal study, avoided
defining the term: "No attempt is made to define reasonable doubt even though it is proba-
bly the most influential portion of a jury charge. It is so difficult to speak with assurance on
the validity of a particular definition, that it seemed best to leave the matter to the courts." I
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, WORKING PAPERS 1 I-
12 (1970). Although Winship apparently requires the trial court to consider or instruct on
the reasonable doubt standard, no court has held that a failure to define "reasonable" is
reversible error. For a valiant attempt at a jury instruction on this issue, see the District of
Columbia's instruction, note 16 supra.
49. At least one recent major criminal codification effort, the long-disputed S. 1437,
95th Cong., Ist Sess., 123 CONG. REC. S6833-41 (1977), apparently interprets Winship on its
face and completely dispenses with the presumption of innocence. See note I I supra. The
proposed bill eliminates the presumption with little discussion; the Committee Report sim-
ply states: "Current federal law is simple, direct, and constitutional in dimension. The pros-
ecution has the burden of persuasion as to each element of the offense and it must carry that
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt." S. REP. No. 605, supra note I1, at 1135. The
Committee Report contains no further discussion of the reasonable doubt standard and does
not elaborate on all the reasons for dispensing with the presumption. The Committee pre-
sumably read Winship as requiring the reasonable doubt instruction alone and as recogniz-
ing that additional language on the presumption of innocence would cause confusion
concerning the methods for instructions on other evidentiary presumptions.
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The Taylor Court did not expressly recognize this discrepancy, however,
and the decision can be criticized because of this omission. If the pre-
sumption of innocence is now of constitutional dimension and is inade-
quately protected by the reasonable doubt standard, it would seem that the
Court will later have to face a juvenile proceeding in which the record is
silent as to the judge's consideration of the presumption of innocence. A
ruling requiring the presumption of innocence instruction would risk the
reopening of a sizeable number of juvenile proceedings for reconsideration
under the Taylor rule. This concern would be magnified if Taylor is to be
applied retroactively, as was the Court's ruling in Winship.50 The Court
may have avoided this problem by stating that the peculiar facts of the
Taylor case dictated its holding.51 Thus, the Court's holding may not be
extended. If, however, the uniqueness of the case is the sole reason for the
Court's treatment, it could have reversed the state court decision without a
lengthy discussion of the nature of the presumption of innocence. A per
curiam or perhaps even a summary reversal might have been more appro-
priate.
This is not to say, of course, that the presumption of innocence/reason-
able doubt standard is not important and necessary. Indeed, the rule that a
person may be convicted of a crime only upon evidence adduced at an
50. In Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233 (1977), the Supreme Court made
retroactive an earlier reasonable doubt decision, Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), in
which the burden of persuasion shifted to the defendant to prove that the lack of malice in a
homicide prosecution impaired the constitutionally-mandated requirement that the prosecu-
tion prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Winship was held to be retroactive in Ivan V.
v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203 (1972) (per curiam). In both cases, the test the Court
formulated for applying retroactivity was whether the constitutional error "substantially im-
pairs [the trial's] truth-finding function. ... Id. at 205. Because the presumption of inno-
cence is directly related to the reasonable doubt standard, it is not improbable that the
Taylor decision meets the test for retroactivity, since the Court held that the omission of the
presumption instruction might have misled the jury. A significant number of cases will not
be affected however, since most jurisdictions give the instruction. See note 5 supra.
51. The majority stated: "We hold that on the facts of this case the trial court's refusal
to give petitioner's requested instruction on the presumption of innocence resulted in a vio-
lation of his right to a fair trial ... " 436 U.S. at 490. The facts apparently most persuasive
to the Court in its decision to reverse were the trial court's failure to give the requested
instructions, the skeletal instructions it did choose to give, and the prosecution's closing ar-
gument in which he inferred as to the defendant's guilt based on his stature as a criminal
defendant. See id. at 486-87. The Court found that there was a "genuine danger that the
jury would convict petitioner on the basis of these extraneous considerations, rather than on
the evidence introduced at trial." Id. at 488.
In his concurrence, Justice Brennan views the Taylor case as not limited to its facts.
Rather, he concludes that the presumption of innocence instruction is constitutionally man-
dated whenever requested by a criminal defendant. Id. at 490-91. By contrast, the two
dissenters, Justices Stevens and Rehnquist, are unable to discern any constitutional error,
although they concede that Taylor "was by no means a perfect trial." Id. at 492.
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open trial, in which he or she may fully participate, is one of the hallmarks
of our legal system. 52 Nothing in this article should be taken as an asser-
tion that these protections should be obliterated. Rather, the point is
merely that a jury instruction on the presumption of innocence adds noth-
ing to these other protections. It is unnecessarily duplicative if some in-
struction is given on the reasonable doubt standard and, without
clarification, it could confuse jurors during their deliberations since true
presumptions simply do not work in the same manner as the presumption
of innocence.
III. THE "PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE" AS A JURY INSTRUCTION
The majority opinion in Taylor asserted on several occasions that the
primary function of the presumption of innocence concept is to serve as an
admonition to lay jurors. The Court emphasized that the instruction
serves a "special purpose"5 3 beyond that covered by a reasonable doubt
instruction: "While the legal scholar may understand that the presump-
tion of innocence and the prosecutor's burden of proof are logically simi-
lar, the ordinary citizen well may draw significant additional guidance
from [the presumption of innocence instruction]. ' '54 This assertion is ap-
parently grounded on a supposition of Wigmore's that the instruction
serves a special and perhaps useful purpose beyond the reasonable doubt
standard, "in that it cautions the jury to put away from their minds all the
suspicion that arises from the arrest, the indictment, and the arraignment,
and to reach their conclusion solely from the legal evidence adduced." 55
These speculative conclusions are extremely thin material on which to
fashion a constitutional doctrine. Both the Court's and Wigmore's lan-
guage may be characterized as "fireside equities" - those judge-made
rules that are the product of instinctive reactions to issues in lieu of proper
fact-finding.5 6 In Taylor, the Court uses Wigmore's speculation as a sub-
52. See, e.g., G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 524-52 (1978). Professor
Fletcher's thesis is that the protection of the defendant arises from proper handling of the
various burdens of persuasion involved in criminal trials and that the focus of any discus-
sion in this area should be on the allocations of the burden of persuasion.
53. 436 U.S. at 488.
54. Id. at 484.
55. Id. at 485 (quoting J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2511 (3d ed. 1940)).
56. One writer who addresses himself to the "fireside equities" is Dr. Paul E. Meehl, a
clinical psychologist. Dr. Meehl's message is simple: "in thinking about law as a mode of
social control, adopt a healthy skepticism toward the fireside inductions, subjecting them to
test by statistical methods applied to data collected in the field situation ...." Meehl, Law
and the Fireside Inductions- Some Reftections of a Cinical Psychologist, in T. TAPP & F.




stitute for a comprehensive discussion of the more basic issues that arise in
jury instruction. Wigmore merely suggests that the presumption instruc-
tion can provide an additional "hint" that the arrest and indictment are
not evidence. The Court raises this "hint" to the level of a constitutional
command without the slightest empirical analysis of whether jurors gener-
ally are guided by court instructions.
Jury instructions have long been one of the most troublesome yet least
analyzed factors in our system of criminal jurisprudence. Defective or im-
properly refused jury instructions are frequently grounds for reversal of
convictions.57 Nevertheless, there has been little work undertaken to ex-
amine jury instructions in light of what other academic disciplines know
about human behavior.58 Psychologists, for example, have analyzed the
capacity of a listener to absorb large quantities of orally recited, technical
material.59 Likewise, there is a growing body of information on the man-
ner in which groups of persons make collective decisions.60 Neither the
courts nor the academic bar, however, has fully assimilated this data. In-
structions, and even specific phrasing of parts of instructions, have often
been deemed indispensible without a hard look at whether jurors pay any
attention to them.
6'
57. See, e.g., Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607 (1946); United States v. Gipson,
553 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1977); Golden v. United States, 318 F.2d 357 (1st Cir. 1963). See
FED. R. CRIM. P. 30; FED. R. Civ. P. 51.
58. One of the few empirical studies testing juror understanding of instructions is de-
scribed in Strawn & Buchanan, Jury Confusion.- A Threat to Justice, 59 JUDICATURE 478
(1976) (finding that the use of legal jargon, such as "material allegation," "information,"
"demeanor," tended to confuse jurors). Recent use of social science information has been
directed more toward manipulation of jury verdicts than the seeking of objective informa-
tion on juror behavior. See, e.g., McConahay, Mullin & Frederick, The Uses of Social Sci-
ence in Trials with Political and Racial Overtones- The Trial of Joan Little, 41 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBs. 205 (1977); Zeisel & Diamond, The Jury Selection in the Mitchell-Stans
Conspiracy Trial, 1976 AM. BAR FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 151 (1975). A salutary develop-
ment which provides some hope for the future is the relatively new funding of law-directed
empirical research projects by the National Science Foundation. See, e.g., The Effects of
Videotape Testimony in Jury Trials. Studies on Juror Decision Making, Information, Reten-
tion, and Emotional.Arousal, 1975 B.Y.U.L. REV. 331.
59. See, e.g., W. KOLESNIK, EDUCATION PSYCHOLOGY 236-65 (1963). In the chapter on
efficient learning, Kolesnik discusses and cites most of the major learning theory experi-
ments.
60. See, e.g., E. McGINNIES, SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: A FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 178-223
(1970).
61. The general rule requires that the defendant object to instructions that he deems
improper, but under the doctrine of "plain error" the court has the obligation to instruct
correctly in certain instances even if the defendant proffers no instruction or fails to object to
the erroneous language. See United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. United States, 330 U.S.
395 (1947); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945); United States v. Heavlow, 468 F.2d
842 (3d Cir. 1972); 5 L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES §§
30.55, 30:56 (1967). If courts preferred a more systematic method for juror decision-making,
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Besides the Court's lack of analysis concerning the actual impact of pre-
sumption of innocence instructions, the Taylor opinion may be criticized
for its lack of guidance on how such instructions should be given in future
trials. Although the Court considered the presumption necessary in order
that the jury decide the case on the basis of evidence given at trial rather
than on pre-trial matters, such as custody, indictment, and suspicion, the
Court failed to suggest language appropriate for achieving this purpose.
The Court apparently did not require the retention of the phrase "pre-
sumption of innocence." Indeed, it conceded that the presumption of in-
nocence is more accurately characterized as an "assumption" rather than a
true "presumption. '62 Nevertheless, the Court went on to describe the de-
fendant's proffered instruction, which incorporated the phrase "presump-
tion of innocence," as being "well suited" to perform the "purging
function. '' 63 Thus, the Court was not clear regarding the terminology to be
employed. A switch from "presumed" to "assumed" may eliminate possi-
ble confusion with subsequent instructions on evidentiary presumptions,
but it is highly unlikely that lay persons will perceive any distinction be-
tween the two terms since their dictionary definitions are similar.64 Possi-
bly, the Court approved the term "assumption," not because it is
preferable to "presumption," but because approval of the term may elimi-
nate further litigation of the Taylor issue in those states that have adopted
the Model Penal Code.
65
In basing its holding almost exclusively on the presumption of inno-
cence concept, the Court did not reach Taylor's further claims regarding
the trial court's refusal to give an "indictment-not-evidence" instruction.
66
they could encourage more frequent use of the special verdict. Although there appears to be
no constitutional barrier to the use of jury interrogatories, one circuit has held that the use of
a special verdict was prejudicial error, in part because the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure nowhere expressly recognize the mechanism. United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165 (1st
Cir. 1969).
62. 436 U.S. at 484 n.12.
63. Id. at 488 n.16. For the full requested instruction, see note 16 supra.
64. For example, one major dictionary defines "assume" as "to take for granted, to
accept as true until proof to the contrary is furnished;..." "Presume" is defined as "to
take for granted, or without proof; to suppose as fact. WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH
CENTURY DICTIONARY 114, 1425 (2d ed. 1962). Nuances of meaning are not readily appar-
ent. For a proposal which would throw the "presume/assume" issue into even greater con-
fusion, see Ashford & Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions, and Due Process in Criminal
Cases. A Theoretical Overview, 79 YALE L.J. 165 (1969).
65. For a detailed compilation of state criminal codes, most of which were grounded at
least in part on the Model Penal Code, see Note, Justification: The Impact of the ModelPenal
Code on Statutory Reform, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 914, 914-15 & nn. 2-3 (1975).
66. 436 U.S. at 487 n.15. See note 20 supra. The proposed indictment-not-evidence
instruction is quoted in note 16 supra.
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Ironically, this instruction comes much closer 67 to meeting the Court's
main concern - that juries should not rely on collateral matters - than
does the presumption of innocence instruction.
The important issues in Taylor deserve more analysis than the Taylor
Court provided. By its failure to endorse unambiguous and precise lan-
guage and its failure to disapprove unacceptable formulations, the Court
probably insured two results. First, by discerning a constitutional error in
Taylor, the Court may have discouraged further inquiry into the practical
usefulness of the presumption, which, in turn, could stifle needed research
on the overall efficacy of jury instructions. Secondly, many cautious trial
judges will retain the classic presumption of innocence instruction, al-
though the Court appears to invite alteration.68 Therefore, the phrase, pre-
sumption of innocence, with all its inaccuracies, will probably remain as a
part of our judicial jargon for the foreseeable future. As a result, jurors
will continue to hear the instruction, and remain subject to confusion re-
garding its content and the unique purpose it serves.
67. Although the indictment-not-evidence instruction does not mention arrest, custody,
or suspicion, it directly mandates to the jury that it cannot convict on matters other than the
evidence introduced at trial. See note 16 supra.
68. Because the Senate criminal codification, S. 1467, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), dis-
cussed in notes II & 49 supra, has not yet become law, its decision to dispense with the
presumption of innocence instruction and retain the "beyond a reasonable doubt" instruc-
tion may be changed. Its drafters can simply incorporate Taylor in the criminal code revi-
sion. At the least, the federal drafters are on notice that they may not totally dispense with a
presumption/assumption of innocence admonition.
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